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Abstract
The Christian Social Union’s domination of Bavarian state and society is such that it
has justifiably been described as Bavaria’s ‘official and hegemonic party’ (Staats- und
Hegemonialpartei). However, it is important not to take the CSU’s regional identity as
an historical given. This article examines how the CSU set about constructing an integral
Bavarian (gesamtbayerisch) identity during the 1950s and early 1960s by articulating the
diverse historical experiences of the region-state’s localities and sub-regions as a common Bavarian
heritage. Drawing on articles about Bavarian cities, reports on historical re-enactments and
commemorative speeches by party leaders, the article explores the celebration of this heritage in
terms of ‘political character’, culture and Christianity.
In his posthumously published memoirs Franz Josef Strauss, the former Bavarian
minister-president, asserted that ‘there is no doubt whatsoever about the CSU’s
Bavarian identity’. Indeed, according to Strauss, the party’s ‘unique position, rooted
in Bavarian history and tradition, rests, politically speaking, on three pillars’, the
third of which was ‘the CSU’s identification with Bavaria’.1 Few would disagree.
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Established in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Bavarian Christian Social
Union (CSU) is, like its sister party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), an
interdenominational Christian Democratic party. But whereas the CDU occupies the
centre-right throughout Germany with the exception of Bavaria, this role is reserved
for the CSU in Bavaria. Here, the CSU has governed for all but three years (1954–7)
since 1946 and has been the sole party of government since 1966. It has polled more
than 50 per cent of the vote in every Bavarian regional parliamentary election since
1970 and managed the same feat in federal parliamentary elections between 1957 and
1994.2
Indeed, such has been the CSU’s domination of Bavarian politics that it is
difficult to disentangle the party from the state. The CSU deliberately encourages
this elision, having appropriated many of the symbols of the Bavarian state for its
own party-political purposes. Alf Mintzel’s description of the CSU as Bavaria’s
‘official and hegemonic party’ (Staats- und Hegemonialpartei) is therefore perfectly
apt.3 This symbiotic relationship between party and region means that the CSU
can be characterised as a regionalist party; and while it is not, strictly speaking, an
ethno-regionalist party, it nevertheless shares some traits with such organisations. The
CSU’s identification with Bavaria is therefore comparable with, for example, that of
Convergence and Unity (CiU) with Catalonia, the Scottish National Party (SNP)
with Scotland and even Italy’s Lega Nord (LN) with ‘Padania’.4 Moreover, while
these parties construct their regions as historic nations and seek to mobilise support
through a nationalist discourse, the CSU deploys similar devices in emphasising
Bavaria’s historic statehood and in using the emotive language of Heimat (literally,
‘homeland’).5
Yet the CSU is more than simply a regionalist party; it is also a federal party insofar
as it plays an active role on the national political stage. The CSU’s position in federal
politics is framed by two overriding objectives, both of which form part of Bavaria’s
state tradition reaching back into the early nineteenth century: the protection and
furtherance of Bavarian statehood and the Bavarian state’s right to consultation and
participation in German and European affairs.6 The CSU pursues these objectives
through a number of institutional arrangements: its control of the Bavarian state
government allows it to exercise influence through the Bundesrat (the federal
regional chamber of the West German parliament) and other intergovernmental
bodies, such as the regular conferences of minister-presidents.7 At the same time,
the CSU regional group (Landesgruppe) in the Bundestag (the federal parliament) has
2 Alf Mintzel, Die CSU-Hegemonie in Bayern: Strategie und Erfolg; Gewinner und Verlierer (Passau:
Wissenschaftsverlag Richard Rothe, 1998), 30, 31, tables 2 and 3.
3 Ibid., 27.
4 For ethno-regionalist parties, see Lieven De Winter and Huri Tu¨rsan, eds., Regionalist Parties in Western
Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).
5 Claire Sutherland, ‘Nation, Heimat, Vaterland: The Reinvention of Concepts by the Bavarian CSU’,
German Politics, 10, 3 (2003), 13–36.
6 Mintzel, CSU-Hegemonie, 92.
7 Andreas Kiessling, Die CSU: Machterhalt und Machterneuerung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fu¨r
Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 131; Uwe Leonardy, ‘The Institutional Structures of German Federalism’,
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been able to exercise disproportionate influence through its parliamentary alliance
(Fraktionsgemeinschaft) with the CDU. In particular, the CSU’s participation in federal
governments in 1949–69, 1982–98 and since 2005 has enabled the party to advance
Bavarian regionalist interests while simultaneously shaping German and European
affairs.8
The CSU thus performs a dual role as both a regionalist and a federal party.9
As a regionalist party its political legitimacy resides primarily in its identification
with the Bavarian state. But it uses this identification – underpinned by the party’s
regional electoral dominance – to project itself on to the German political stage. For
the CSU representing the regionalist interest is therefore compatible with a national
political vocation. It is this national dimension that distinguishes the CSU from
ethno-regionalist parties, for it neither constructs Bavaria as a nation in its own right
nor eschews the German national state.10 The CSU can therefore legitimately claim
to be both a Bavarian and a German party.11 Yet just as Mintzel has been at pains to
emphasise that the CSU’s hegemony was not foreordained,12 so it is equally important
not to take the party’s regional identity – its identification with Bavaria and its
understanding of Bavaria’s relationship with the nation – as an historical given. While
the CSU has always identified itself with the territorial and institutional integrity of
the Bavarian state, its early years were characterised by bitter internal disputes between
liberal conservatives and clerical conservatives over different conceptions of the party,
of Bavaria and of Bavaria’s place within a future German national state.13
This article seeks to trace an aspect of these debates that has so far not received
adequate scholarly attention. Scholars of the CSU recognise that the party forged a
Bavarian identity that combined a ‘liberal’ commitment to modernisation and the
nation with a ‘conservative’ belief in tradition and the region, mediated through
moderate federalism – an identity that made possible the CSU’s attempts gradually to
elide party and state from the mid-1950s onwards.14 Yet while political scientists
and historians have done much to explore the CSU’s organisation, federalism,
in Charlie Jeffrey, ed., Recasting German Federalism: The Legacies of Unification (London and New York:
Pinter, 1999), 3–22.
8 For the CSU regional group, see Kiessling, CSU, 134–46; Petra Weber, ‘Fo¨deralismus und Lobbyismus.
Die CSU-Landesgruppe zwischen Bundes- und Landespolitik 1949 bis 1969’, in Thomas Schlemmer
and Hans Woller, eds., Bayern im Bund. Band 3: Politik und Kultur im fo¨derativen Staat 1949 bis 1973
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004), 23–116.
9 The term ‘dual role’ is Mintzel’s. Mintzel, CSU-Hegemonie, 92.
10 Cf. Sutherland, ‘Nation, Heimat, Vaterland’, 21–2, who nevertheless argues that conceptually the CSU
is a ‘contemporary nationalist party’ with regard to Bavaria.
11 Albrecht Mintzel, ‘The Christian Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany’, in Mario Caciagli
et al., eds., DC: Christian Democracy in Europe (Barcelona: Institut de Cie`ncies Politiques i Sociales,
1992), 55–82, at 72.
12 Mintzel, CSU-Hegemonie, 28.
13 Thomas Schlemmer, Aufbruch, Krise und Erneuerung: Die Christlich-Soziale Union 1945 bis 1955 (Munich:
Oldenbourg, 1998).
14 Mintzel, CSU-Hegemonie, 46; Mark S. Milosch, Modernizing Bavaria: The Politics of Franz Josef Strauß and
the CSU, 1949–1969 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2006), 51; Thomas Schlemmer, ‘Zwischen
Tradition und Traditionsbildung: Die CSU auf dem Weg zur Hegemonialpartei 1945 bis 1976’,
Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts fu¨r soziale Bewegungen, 24 (2000), 159–80, esp. 161, 170, 177.
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ideology, industrial modernisation policies and discourse, less attention has been
paid to the CSU’s identification with Bavaria as a place.15 And despite important new
insights, the same is generally true of recent interest in postwar Bavarian identity.
Without exaggerating the threat to Bavarian territorial integrity, historians have
nonetheless highlighted intra-Bavarian tensions, manifested at their most extreme
in ‘separatist’ demands in Swabia and Franconia. The focus of this research has
consequently been on the construction of Bavarian ‘state consciousness’, an approach
that has concentrated primarily on the symbols and institutions of statehood – the
constitution, flag, coat of arms, anthem, order of merit and the role of the minister-
president – as well as the ‘politics of history’, such as museums, exhibitions and
historical associations.16 The CSU was certainly instrumental in this process of state
building, but not exclusively so. More importantly, these studies do not consider how
the CSU constructed, understood and identified with Bavaria as a place.
Drawing primarily on the speeches of party leaders Hans Ehard and Hanns Seidel,
along with the party newspaper, the Bayern-Kurier, this article explores how an integral
Bavarian (gesamtbayerisch) identity was being constructed between 1949 and 1962. This
is not to suggest that there was a direct causal link between the CSU’s regional identity
and its gradual electoral conquest of Bavaria. Nevertheless, an integral Bavarian
identity was essential if the CSU was to become a truly interdenominational party
and therefore the ‘official party’ of Bavarian state and society.17 The years between
1949 and 1962 were decisive in this development. Prior to 1949, the issue of the
CSU’s regional identity was subsumed by disagreements over Bavaria’s relationship
with a future German national state. The establishment of the Federal Republic
changed the political parameters, for the CSU had now to accommodate itself to
the new – if only partial – national state, while also being locked in a fratricidal
struggle with a regionalist rival, the Bavarian Party (Bayernpartei or BP). By the early
1960s, however, the CSU had all but vanquished the BP and had asserted itself as
the dominant political force in Bavaria. Moreover, the early 1960s can be considered
a watershed in both Bavarian and West German politics, as Hanns Seidel died in
1961, Hans Ehard stepped down as minister-president in 1962 and Konrad Adenauer
resigned as federal chancellor in 1963.
15 Alf Mintzel, Die CSU: Anatomie einer konservativen Partei 1945–1972 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag,
1975); Schlemmer, Aufbruch; Karl-Ulrich Gelberg, Hans Ehard: Die fo¨deralistische Politik des bayerischen
Ministerpra¨sidenten 1946–1954 (Du¨sseldorf: Droste, 1992); Aline Marie Kuntz, ‘Conservatives in Crisis:
The Bavarian Christian Social Union and the Ideology of Antimodernism’, Ph.D. thesis, Cornell
University, 1987; Milosch, Modernizing Bavaria; Sutherland, ‘Nation, Heimat, Vaterland’.
16 Ulrike Stoll, ‘Bayern – ein Land ohne Identita¨tsprobleme?’, Geschichte im Westen, 16, 1 (2001), 20–37;
Ulla-Britta Vollhardt, ‘Zwischen Staatstradition und Regionalbewußtsein: Staatliche Heimatpolitik
in Bayern nach 1945’, in Habbo Knoch, ed., Das Erbe der Provinz: Heimatkultur und Geschichtspolitik
nach 1945 (Go¨ttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2001), 117–42; Karl-Ulrich Gelberg, ‘Staatsbewusstsein
und Fo¨deralismus in Bayern nach 1945’, Politische Studien, 392 (2003), 64–78; Thomas Mergel,
‘Staatlichkeit und Landesbewußtsein: Politische Symbole und Staatsrepra¨sentation in Bayern und
Nordrhein-Westfalen 1945 bis 1975’, in Schlemmer and Woller, Politik und Kultur, 281–347;
Edgar Wolfrum, ‘Geschichtspolitik in Bayern: Traditionsvermittlung, Vergangenheitsbearbeitung und
popula¨res Geschichtsbewußtsein nach 1945’, in ibid., 349–409.
17 Schlemmer, ‘Tradition’, 161.
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Ehard and Seidel were the CSU’s most important regional politicians during this
period: Ehard as party chairman (1949–55) and minister-president (1946–54 and
1960–62), Seidel as party chairman (1955–61), minister of economics (1947–54) and
minister-president (1957–60). Although Ehard was generally more sympathetic to
the CSU’s clerical-conservative wing, he was not a ‘party man’ as such. Rather, he
identified first and foremost with the Bavarian state, his conception of which appears
to have been shaped by his background as a Franconian and career civil servant,
not to mention his marriage to a Protestant. Hence, while the CSU’s organisation
deteriorated under his leadership, as a well-respected minister-president he is credited
with having held the party together. In particular, he can be considered as one of
the architects of the party’s ‘moderate federalism’.18 Ehard’s articulation of a Bavarian
‘state consciousness’ can be seen in a similar light as laying the discursive groundwork
for the party’s reform-minded elements. Chief among these was Ehard’s successor:
the Franconian Hanns Seidel. Seidel belonged to the CSU’s liberal-conservative
wing, and it was under his auspices that the party’s organisational modernisation was
initiated in the mid-1950s.19 The Bayern-Kurier was a vehicle for party reformers. It
was founded in 1950 by Lorenz Sedlmayr – a man whose roots were in the Christian
trade union movement and who was a long-time advocate of a Christian people’s
party20 – and by Franz Josef Strauss, both of whom were on the liberal-conservative
wing of the party.21 Strauss, moreover, had become CSU general secretary in 1948
and was already emerging as the party’s most important federal politician.
The principal contention of this article is that, in forging an integral identity,
the CSU exploited Bavaria’s urban past as a ‘political resource’,22 articulating the
diverse historical experiences and traditions of the state’s localities and sub-regions
as a common Bavarian heritage. As David Lowenthal argues, ‘heritage is not
history’, but rather a celebration of the past; it is ‘a profession of faith in a past
tailored to present-day purposes’.23 In this respect, heritage draws on the past in
order to fix identity by reconciling, integrating and synthesising contradictory and
conflicting histories.24 The emphasis on a local sense of place – in commemorative
speeches, reports on historical re-enactments and articles about Bavarian towns and
18 For Ehard, see Gelberg, Hans Ehard.
19 For Seidel, see Hans Ferdinand Gross, Hanns Seidel 1901–1961: Eine politische Biographie (Munich:
Archiv fu¨r Christlich-Soziale Politik der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, 1992).
20 Noel D. Cary, The Path to Christian Democracy: German Catholics and the Party System from Windthorst
to Adenauer (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 74–6.
21 For the Bayern-Kurier see Heinz-Dietrich Fischer, Parteien und Presse in Deutschland seit 1945 (Bremen:
Schu¨nemann Universita¨tsverlag, 1971), 159–60, 200–1; Alf Mintzel, Die CSU, 165, 338–42; Gross,
Hanns Seidel, 143–4.
22 For heritage as a ‘political resource’, see G. J. Ashworth and Brian Graham, ‘Senses of Place, Senses
of Time and Heritage’, in G. J. Ashworth and Brian Graham, eds., Senses of Place: Senses of Time
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 3–12, at 7, 8.
23 David Lowenthal, The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), x.
24 Ibid., xi. A similar point has been made with regard to ‘collective memory’ in Alon Confino, The
Nation as a Local Metaphor: Wu¨rttemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918 (Chapel
Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 8.
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cities – was therefore about much more than fostering local pride. Given that both the
region-state and the nation-state are essentially abstract concepts, the local allowed
for the articulation of the tangible, which could be presented as both unique and
representative at one and the same time.25 This article reveals how the celebration of
local heritage as such was central to the CSU’s regional identity, politically, culturally
and spiritually.
The development of party politics in Bavaria since the 1860s
The CSU’s regional identity formation was contested. In order to understand why
this was the case it is first necessary to sketch out the development of party politics
in Bavaria since the late 1860s. While a Bavarian territorial entity has existed in
some form or other for more than a millennium, the modern state is in fact a
product of the Napoleonic Wars, when the Electorate of Bavaria (‘Old Bavaria’)
acquired numerous smaller territories in Swabia and Franconia (‘New Bavaria’).26
The Bavarian ministerial bureaucracy subsequently set out to forge a unifying ‘state
consciousness’, but in terms of political culture Bavaria remained fragmented in
what Mintzel refers to as ‘traditional zones’: Old Bavaria, Swabia and Franconia, the
first two of which were predominantly Catholic, while the latter can be subdivided
into Catholic Main-Franconia and a Franconian-Protestant corridor.27 Importantly,
modern party politics took on somewhat different manifestations in each of these
zones, shaped primarily, though by no means solely, by denomination and attitudes
to the nation.
Since Bavaria was a predominantly Catholic state, political Catholicism emerged
as the dominant force in Bavarian politics from the late 1860s in the shape of the
Patriot Party, which, following its merger with the Centre Party in 1887, became the
Bavarian Centre Party. From the beginning, however, Bavarian political Catholicism
was inextricably linked with the politics of regionalism. Hence the Patriots initially
opposed German unification under Prussian auspices and later sought to defend
Bavarian autonomy within the German empire.28 Bavarian political Catholicism was
by no means homogeneous, however. As Mintzel has pointed out, it was characterised
by two basic currents: clerical-conservative and Bavarian-patriotic in Old Bavaria and
more German-oriented in Swabia and Main-Franconia.29
The Bavarian Centre did not, however, monopolise regionalist politics, for in the
mid-1890s the Bavarian Peasants’ League (BBB) emerged as a particularist, democratic
25 Alon Confino, ‘Federalism and the Heimat Idea in Imperial Germany’, in Maiken Umbach, ed.,
German Federalism: Past, Present, Future (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 70–90, at 78.
26 Peter Claus Hartmann, Bayerns Weg in die Gegenwart: Vom Stammers herzogtum, zum Freistaat heute, 2nd
edn (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2004), 351–6.
27 Mintzel, CSU-Hegemonie, 33–8.
28 For a good summary see Dieter Albrecht, ‘Von der Reichsgru¨ndung bis zum Ende des Ersten
Weltkrieges (1871–1918)’, in Alois Schmid, ed., Handbuch der bayerischen Geschichte. Bd. IV: Das Neue
Bayern: Von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart. Erster Teilband: Staat und Politik 2nd edn (Munich: C. H. Beck,
2003), 318–438, at 336–45.
29 Mintzel, CSU-Hegemonie, 39.
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and anti-clerical rival in the Catholic countryside.30 Protestant Franconia, on the other
hand, was essentially terra incognita for political Catholicism. Instead it was known
for its strong German national orientation, represented above all by the national
liberals and social democrats; and these parties also performed well in urban-industrial
enclaves throughout the region.31 Bavaria therefore lacked an integral political party.32
In the aftermath of the First World War, particularist elements in the Bavarian
Centre forced its secession from the national party, creating the Bavarian People’s Party
(BVP) in its stead. The BVP aspired to be both an interconfessional party and the
‘official party’ of Bavarian state and society. Unlike the CSU after 1945, it was neither.
This stemmed from the fact that the BVP was in reality a party of political Catholicism
and therefore all but unelectable in Protestant Franconia. But even in its Catholic
heartlands it was unable to achieve hegemony, since it faced electoral competition
from the Peasants’ League. Although both the BVP and the CSU presented themselves
as the defenders of Bavarian statehood, the substance was different. The CSU
became – after its traumatic early years – a party of moderate federalism and an active
participant in the construction of a democratic West German state. In particular,
the parliamentary alliance with the CDU enabled the CSU to further Bavarian
interests while simultaneously accepting national governmental responsibility. The
BVP, however, used federalism to challenge the democratic Weimar state in the
early 1920s and marginalised itself in national politics by ending its parliamentary
arrangement with the Centre Party in the Reichstag. Although the BVP later
became more conciliatory, it remained a party dominated by the backward-looking
particularism of rural and small-town Catholic Old Bavaria.33
Following the Second World War Catholic parties throughout western Europe
eschewed confessional politics in favour of non-confessional ‘Christian’ and
democratic politics. Although these Christian Democratic parties manifested
themselves differently in terms of both time and place, they were characterised
by a core commitment to ‘Christian values’. Strongly influenced by Catholic social
teaching and sharing a suspicion of liberalism and social democracy and a deep
hostility to communism, Christian Democratic parties embraced, to a greater or
lesser extent, the social market economy, social partnership, European integration
and the Atlantic Alliance.34 Yet while Christian Democratic parties did not subscribe
to confessional politics, most were essentially parties of practising Catholics. In
Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, the postwar Christian People’s Party-
Social Christian Party (CVP-PSC) and Catholic People’s Party (KVP) respectively
30 Albrecht, ‘Von der Reichsgru¨ndung’, 350–3.
31 Mintzel, CSU-Hegemonie, 39.
32 Ibid., 39–40.
33 Klaus Scho¨nhoven, Die Bayerische Volkspartei 1924–1932 (Du¨sseldorf: Droste, 1972); D. R. Dorondo,
Bavaria and German Federalism: Reich to Republic, 1918–33, 1945–49 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992).
34 See David Hanley, ‘Introduction: Christian Democracy as a Political Phenomenon’, in David Hanley,
ed., Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective (London: Pinter, 1994), 1–11; Kees
van Kersbergen, ‘The Distinctiveness of Christian Democracy’, in ibid., 31–47; Anton Pelinka,
‘European Christian Democracy in Comparison’, in Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser, eds.,
Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945 (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 193–206.
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were initially little more that reincarnations of prewar Catholic parties.35 And even
the French Mouvement Re´publicain Populaire (MRP), usually considered to be the
archetypal Christian Democratic party of the late 1940s and 1950s, drew its support
predominantly from traditionally conservative ‘Christian’ regions.36
More emphatically than elsewhere in post-Second World War western Europe, the
West German CDU and the Bavarian CSU were conceived as interdenominational
parties. The aspiration to an interconfessional movement was not new, but it was made
possible by the discrediting of Weimar-era conservative nationalism, liberalism and, to
a lesser extent, political Catholicism and the trauma of the Third Reich.37 That West
German Christian Democracy manifested itself in two parties was, however, in part
fortuitous. Under Allied occupation between 1945 and 1949, party formation took
place from below, creating as a consequence relatively strong regional associations.
But West Germany’s region-states (La¨nder) were largely new entities, with the notable
exceptions of Hamburg, Bremen and Bavaria. The CSU’s formation was therefore
shaped by an existing state tradition and a strong regionalist impulse; and the latter
quickly asserted itself against those who envisaged the CSU as a constituent association
of a future Christian ‘Reich Union’. Hence, while the CSU was willing to co-
operate with the CDU, it chose to preserve its autonomy when the CDU regional
associations finally established a federal party organisation in 1950.38 As such, the
CDU and CSU constituted two separate and distinct political parties, with the
former generally considered to be ‘more centrist, more pluralistic, less Catholic
and less conservative’ than its Bavarian sister party.39 Yet despite the immediate
postwar hopes invested in Christian Democracy, it took years before the CDU
and CSU became truly interconfessional parties.40 The internecine struggle between
the CSU’s liberal-conservative and clerical-conservative wings was in part a battle for
the interdenominational soul of the party and, by extension, over whether the CSU
would embrace an integral Bavarian identity.
The CSU’s liberal-conservative wing was strongest in Franconia, where former
members of the liberal and nationalist parties often helped to co-found the
party. Its advocates viewed the CSU as an interdenominational party within the
emerging Christian Democratic mainstream and favoured a reasonably strong central
government within a federal German state.41 The clerical-conservative wing, on the
35 Jac Bosmans, ‘The Primacy of Domestic Politics: Christian Democracy in the Netherlands’, in Gehler
and Kaiser, Christian Democracy in Europe, 54–66, at 54–6; Emiel Lamberts, ‘The Zenith of Christian
Democracy: The Christelijke Volkspartij/Parti Social Chre´tien in Belgium’, in ibid., 67–84, at 67.
36 Bruno Be´thouart, ‘Entry of the Catholics into the Republic: The Mouvement Re´publicain Populaire
in France’, in ibid., 85–100, at 86.
37 Schlemmer, Aufbruch, 9–10.
38 Alf Mintzel, Geschichte der CSU: Ein U¨berblick (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1977), 78–93.
39 R.E.M. Irving, The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1979), 112.
40 For the integration of Catholics and Protestants into an interdenominational CDU, see Frank Bo¨sch,
Die Adenauer-CDU: Gru¨ndung, Aufstieg und Krise einer Erfolgspartei 1945–1969 (Stuttgart and Munich:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001).
41 Schlemmer, Aufbruch, 90, 93.
The Christian Social Union and Bavaria’s Common Heritage, 1949–1962 285
other hand, saw the party essentially as the successor to the BVP and favoured a
federal solution for Germany that would privilege the autonomy of the region-
states.42 For the clerical conservatives, Bavaria was largely synonymous with Old
Bavaria, a deeply rural and Catholic world in which the Counter-Reformation,
the Thirty Years War and the Kulturkampf were the principal historical reference
points.43 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the balance of power within the CSU
shifted towards the clerical conservatives, marginalising liberal, national-conservative
and Protestant voices.44 Consequently, the CSU’s claim to be an interdenominational
party rang increasingly hollow. Indeed, in terms of membership and organisation the
party seemed little more than an imitation of the BVP, thus alienating Franconian
Protestants to the point of potential schism.45
The CSU’s claim to represent the Bavarian regionalist interest was also challenged
by the emergence of the Bavarian Party (Bayernpartei or BP). First established in
1946, the US occupation authorities refused the BP a licence to contest elections at
the regional level until 1948, thus shielding the CSU from a regionalist rival in its
formative years. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, the BP made significant
inroads into the CSU’s electorate and its membership, above all in the Old Bavarian
countryside. Like the CSU, the BP was also heir to the traditions of the BVP and, to
a lesser extent, the BBB. And its particularism, characterised by Bavarian patriotism,
extreme federalism and anti-Prussianism, appealed to many of the CSU’s clerical
conservatives. Importantly, there were even strong voices in the CSU urging closer
co-operation between the two parties.46 Such demands hinted at the prospect of a new
political constellation among Bavaria’s regionalist forces. That this did not happen was
primarily due to the opposition of Hans Ehard, then the Bavarian minister-president,
and Franz Josef Strauss, the CSU general secretary at the time. Ehard feared that
coalescing with the BP would discredit his strategy of constructive and moderate
federalism, while Strauss disdained the BP’s backward-looking parochialism, which
he viewed as a hindrance to Bavaria’s economic modernisation.47
The BP was not the only electoral competitor the CSU had to face in the late
1940s and early 1950s. As a consequence of the war and its aftermath, Bavaria
became home to millions of refugees and expellees, coming mainly from the
Sudetenland and Silesia. The US authorities had initially refused to license a refugees’
party. As a consequence, in the 1949 Bundestag elections, a significant number of
refugees and expellees supported the populist Economic Reconstruction Association
(Wirtschaftliche Aufbau-Vereinigung, WAV), propelling it to 14.4 per cent of the
42 Ibid., 90–1, 93.
43 Kuntz, ‘Conservatives in Crisis’, 69–70, 156.
44 Schlemmer, Aufbruch, 365, 411.
45 Ibid., 365, 416, 418, 437.
46 For the BP see Ilse Unger, Die Bayernpartei: Geschichte und Struktur 1945–1957 (Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 1979); Konstanze Wolf, CSU und Bayernpartei: Ein besonderes Konkurrenzverha¨ltnis
1948–1960 (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1984).
47 Ian Farr and Graham Ford, ‘Bavaria’s “German Mission”: The CSU and the Politics of Regional
Identity, 1949–c.1962’, in William Lancaster, Diana Newton and Natasha Vall, eds., An Agenda for
Regional History (Newcastle: Northumbria University Press, 2007, forthcoming).
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vote. But by the time of the 1950Bavarian elections a specific refugees’ party had come
into being – the Union of Expellees and Dispossessed (Bund der Heimatvertriebenen
und Entrechteten, BHE) – which managed to secure 12.3 per cent of the regional
vote.48 At this point – in the early 1950s – then, the combination of internal crisis and
the fragmentation of the political landscape meant that the CSU seemed destined to
share the fate of the BVP: to be a party from Bavaria rather than the party of Bavaria.
Yet by the early 1960s the CSU had become the dominant political force in
Bavaria; and a decade later it was the hegemonic ‘official party’ of Bavarian state
and society. There is no simple explanation for this triumph, but a number of salient
factors can be elucidated. The first of these is organisational. According to Mintzel,
the ‘turning point in the history of the CSU’ was its expulsion from office in 1954 by a
four-party coalition composed of the social democrats, liberals, the BP and the BHE.
This proved to be the catalyst for the overhaul of the party’s internal structures, one
consequence of which was that the clerical conservatives were gradually displaced by
a younger generation of pragmatic politicians committed to an interdenominational,
liberal-conservative and moderately federal party with a professional bureaucracy and
a mass membership.49
The CSU’s improved electoral performance during the 1950s also stemmed from
the economic context. By the second half of the decade West Germany had entered
the era of the ‘economic miracle’; and the Bavarian economy benefited particularly
because the CSU drove a policy of regional economic modernisation, characterised
by major infrastructural improvements and the siting of new technological industries,
that transformed the region-state.50 The CSU was careful, however, not to abandon
its more traditional supporters. Hence party leaders talked of Bavaria as an ‘industrial-
agrarian state’, which entailed economic support for farmers and small businesses, as
well as a cultural policy that emphasised rural and small-town customs and traditions.51
‘Managed modernisation’ therefore enabled Bavaria to avoid most of the social
costs associated with nineteenth-century industrialisation.52 At the same time the
concomitant erosion of traditional sociocultural milieux actually proved beneficial to
the CSU, as the party was able to use its expanding organisational power to create an
integral Bavarian social milieu of its own.53
Bavaria’s rapidly growing economy also facilitated and benefited from the
integration of the state’s many refugees and expellees.54 But economic factors alone
do not explain the CSU’s ability increasingly to garner the support of Bavaria’s newest
inhabitants. Instead, the CSU eventually came to embrace an astute political course:
acting as the principal advocate for the right of refugees and expellees to return to
48 The position of refugees and expellees is summarised in Karl-Ulrich Gelberg, ‘Vom Kriegsende bis
zum A¨ra Goppel (1945–1978)’, in Schmid, Handbuch, 635–956, at 737–55.
49 Mintzel, Geschichte, 67–9; Schlemmer, Aufbruch, 482–4.
50 Milosch, Modernizing Bavaria; Gelberg, ‘Vom Kriegsende’, 840–3.
51 Weber, ‘Fo¨deralismus und Lobbyismus’, 89–106; Farr and Ford, ‘Bavaria’s “German Mission”’.
52 Mintzel, CSU-Hegemonie, 44.
53 Ibid., 54.
54 For the integration of expellees and refugees, see Gelberg, ‘Vom Kriegsende’, 747–50.
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their Heimat, while simultaneously actively promoting their integration into Bavarian
state and society, their new Heimat. This policy was pursued most assiduously towards
the largest expellee group, the Sudeten Germans. Hence in 1954 the Bavarian state
became their patron, and in 1962 the Sudeten Germans were designated as Bavaria’s
‘fourth tribe’ alongside the Old Bavarians, Franconians and Swabians.55
These factors, then, allowed the CSU to assert itself as the dominant force on the
Bavarian centre-right by the early 1960s. Already by 1957 the CSU was able to poll
more than half the vote in that year’s Bundestag elections, a triumph that owed much
to the party’s solid personal support for Konrad Adenauer, the federal chancellor.56 In
regional parliamentary elections the CSU’s advance to hegemony was more gradual:
the party topped the poll in all seven electoral districts in 1958, but this translated
into only 45.6 per cent of the regional vote. By 1970, however, the CSU secured
more than half the overall vote, although it would be another four years before it
won an absolute majority in each and every electoral district.57 For Mintzel, the CSU
was therefore both agent and beneficiary of the homogenisation of Bavaria’s political
culture, which meant that for the first time a political party facilitated the process
of intra-Bavarian integration alongside the state bureaucracy.58 What, though, of the
CSU’s identification with Bavaria as a place?
The CSU and Bavaria’s ‘political character’
The modern Bavarian state is essentially a product of late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century power politics, so much so that it can be considered a ‘French
creation’.59 CSU leaders were, however, sensitive to any suggestion that Bavaria was
an artificial entity. For example, Richard Jaeger, vice-chairman of the CSU regional
group in the Bundestag, wrote that ‘one cannot dismiss Bavaria as an arbitrary
Napoleonic creation’.60 Instead, a teleological narrative of belonging was advanced
to explain Bavaria’s annexation of its new Swabian and Franconian territories, a
narrative which explicitly rejected a simple linear continuity between Old Bavaria and
modern Bavaria. Hans Ehard was therefore able to tell an audience in Nuremberg –
a predominantly Protestant city in central Franconia – that the modern Bavarian
state ‘was not the result of violence and war, but rather, as the time was ripe for
the formation of new states, of the natural joining together of those that belong
together’.61 By choosing to ‘forget’ the violence and brutality that accompanied
55 Ibid., 753–4.
56 Mintzel, Geschichte, 377–80.
57 Mintzel, CSU-Hegemonie, 30, table 2.
58 Ibid., 45.
59 Winfried Schulze, ‘Bayern und die Franzo¨sische Revolution: Machterweiterung und innere Reform’,
in Alois Schmid and Katharina Weigand, eds., Bayern mitten in Europa: Vom Fru¨hmittelalter bis ins 20.
Jahrhundert (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005), 242–63, at 263.
60 ‘Deutscher und europa¨ischer Fo¨deralismus’ (MS, 1954), NL Jaeger P30, Archiv fu¨r Christlich-Soziale
Politik (ACSP), Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, Munich. This was the draft of an article published in Deutsches
Monatsblatt (July 1954), though the section from which the quotation is taken was removed before
publication.
61 Bayerische Staatszeitung, 15 July 1950, 1.
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Bavaria’s enlargement,62 Ehard was able to portray this process as a ‘marriage’ between
Old Bavaria and its new Franconian possessions.63
Ehard understood the Bavarian people in a similarly inclusive manner. Since the
mid-nineteenth century, the Bavarian people (Staatsvolk) had been constructed as a
union of four different ‘tribes’ (Sta¨mme), namely the Old Bavarians, Franconians,
Swabians and Palatines.64 But, as Hans Ehard argued, it was only together – as the
Bavarian people – that they were able to give the state meaning.65 Such inclusivity
was also applied to Bavaria’s principal ‘foundation myth’: the claim in the preamble
to the 1946 state constitution to ‘the more than one-thousand year history of the
Bavarian people’.
This phrase originally alluded to the Bajuwaren, the supposed antecedents of the
Old Bavarians, whose existence was first recorded several decades after the withdrawal
of the Romans from southern Germany.66 In particular, it was generally understood
to refer to the establishment of the stem duchy of Bavaria under Garibald I in the sixth
century.67 Ulrike Stoll is representative of most historical opinion when she writes of
the preamble, ‘This reference was not historically accurate as it equated the history
of Bavaria with the history of Old Bavaria’.68 However, the term ‘Bavarian people’
was suitably ambiguous to allow for a more expansive reading. Against the backdrop
of postwar intra-Bavarian tensions, Ernst Deuerlein – at the time Ehard’s principal
speech writer and later an academic historian – claimed that ‘when the new Bavarian
constitution refers to the one-thousand year history of Bavaria, it calls to mind
the four [sub-]regions of Old Bavaria, Swabia, Franconia and the Palatinate’.69 And
articles in the Bayern-Kurier profiling the region’s cities provided historical substance
for this view, for Regensburg (Old Bavaria), Augsburg, Kempten (both Swabia) and
Rothenburg ob der Tauber (Franconia) were each more than a thousand years old.70
Modern Bavaria, as conceptualised by CSU politicians, was not, then, to be
confused with Old Bavaria. It was, instead, to be understood as a synthesis of
the different tribes and traditions that had come together under the auspices
62 Rudolf Endres, ‘Der “Fra¨nkische Separatismus”: Franken und Bayern im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert’,
Mitteilungen des Vereins fu¨r Geschichte der Stadt Nu¨rnberg, 67 (1980), 157–83, at 157, 159–61.
63 Bayerische Staatszeitung, 15 July 1950, 1.
64 For the concept of ‘Sta¨mme’, see Karl Bosl, ‘Was sind Sta¨mme und welche Rolle spielen sie im
modernen bayerischen Staat?’, in Rainer A. Roth, ed., Freistaat Bayern: Die politische Wirklichkeit eines
Landes der Bundesrepublik, 4th edn (Munich: Bayerische Landeszentrale fu¨r politische Bildungsarbeit,
1986), 127–37. The Bavarian Palatinate was in the French occupation zone and was therefore
incorporated into the new region-state of Rhineland-Palatinate in 1946. However, the Bavarian
government continued to agitate for its return until 1956. See Karl-Ulrich Gelberg, ‘Die bayerische
Pfalzpolitik 1945–1956 mit einem Quellenanhang’, Zeitschrift fu¨r bayerische Landesgeschichte, 58, 2
(1995), 637–72.
65 Hans Ehard, ‘Franken in Bayern’, in Hans Ehard, Bayerische Politik: Ansprachen und Reden des bayerischen
Ministerpra¨sidenten (Munich: Richard Pflaum Verlag, 1952), 161–71, at 164.
66 Karl Bosl, ‘Die historische Staatlichkeit der Bayerischen Lande’, Zeitschrift fu¨r bayerische Landesgeschichte,
25, 1 (1962), 3–19, at 18–19. For the origins of the Bajuwaren, see Hartmann, Bayerns Weg, 44–8.
67 For the stem duchy of Bavaria, see ibid., 49–52.
68 Stoll, ‘Bayern’, 23. See also Kuntz, ‘Conservatives in Crisis’, 156.
69 Bayerische Staatszeitung, 15 July 1950, 5–6, at 6.
70 Bayern-Kurier, 5 July 1952, 3; 13 June 1953, 3; 3 June 1950, 8; 16 Jan. 1954, 3.
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of the Wittelsbachs to form the modern Bavarian state in the early nineteenth
century. In this respect, Bavaria’s historical diversity could be constructed as the
common heritage of all modern Bavarians. As such, for Ehard and Seidel Bavaria’s
‘political character’, epitomised by the commitment to federalism, stemmed from the
synthesis of two political traditions: the ‘state consciousness’ of Old Bavaria and
the ‘Reich consciousness’ of Franconia and Swabia, the ‘Reich’ in this case being
the Holy Roman Empire.71 Hence Bavaria’s ‘historic statehood’ was rooted in Old
Bavaria’s ‘state tradition’, a particular staple of Catholic regionalists; while Bavaria’s
commitment to Germany was exemplified by the former imperial territories of
the modern state’s Franconian and Swabian sub-regions, a notion likely to resonate
with Protestants of all political persuasions but especially liberals and conservative
nationalists. The articulation of this ‘state tradition’ was particularly bound up with
monarchy. The genesis of the Bavarian state was therefore closely identified with
Regensburg, for ‘with the expulsion of the Romans [it] became the ducal seat of
the Agilolfings’,72 the dynasty to which Garibald I belonged. This allowed Seidel to
claim that the Old Bavarians were the first German ‘tribe’ to possess a capital, thus
emphasising the pre-eminence of Bavarian statehood among West Germany’s region-
states.73 But it was with the House of Wittelsbach, which reigned between 1180 and
1918, that Bavaria’s subsequent history was most closely associated. Consequently,
historical sites connected with the Wittelsbachs functioned as modern reaffirmations
of Bavarian statehood. In particular, given the three partitions of Bavaria in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, four cities had, at one time or another, been
ducal seats: Straubing, Ingolstadt, Landshut and Munich.74
Apart from Munich, the most important of these cities was Landshut.
Commemorating its 750th anniversary in 1954, the Bayern-Kurier noted that
Landshut’s origins were an expression of political will. Landshut was already a
settlement at the foot of an old watchtower, and Duke Ludwig I elevated it to a
city in 1204. Subsequently, ‘the new city of Landshut was deliberately developed by
Ludwig and his son, Duke Otto II, into the capital of the Duchy of Bavaria’.75 Landshut’s
‘golden era’ was during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; indeed, ‘during the
entire fifteenth century the Wittelsbach Dukes of Bavaria-Landshut belonged to
the most influential princely houses of Europe’, with all three dukes earning the
epithet ‘the Rich’.76 The most ostentatious example of this wealth was the wedding
that Ludwig IX held for his son Georg and Hedwig, the daughter of Casimir IV,
the king of Poland, in 1475. The historical re-enactment of this marriage, the so-
called ‘Landshut Royal Wedding’ – first performed in 1903 – was and is, therefore, a
71 Ehard, ‘Franken in Bayern’, 165; ‘Die Aufgabe Bayerns’, MS, n.d. [1955?]), NL Seidel 8, ACSP;
Bayerische Verwaltungsbla¨tter, July 1958, 193, NL Seidel 14, ACSP.
72 Bayern-Kurier, 5 July 1952, 3.
73 Hanns Seidel, ‘Die Haupt- und Residenzstadt Mu¨nchen’, in Hanns Seidel, Zeitprobleme: Gesammelte
Aufsa¨tze und Vortra¨ge (Aschaffenburg: Paul Pattloch Verlag, 1960), 207–13, at 208.
74 For the partitions of Bavaria, see Hartmann, Bayerns Weg, 101–22. Bavaria was reunified in 1505.
75 Bayern-Kurier, 3 July 1954, 3 (emphasis in original).
76 Ibid.
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heritage event invested with regional political meaning as a vital modern reaffirmation
of Bavarian statehood.
It could be argued that for the Bayern-Kurier, the significance of the re-enactment
did not lie solely with Georg’s marriage to Hedwig, but also with the message it
conveyed about the Bavarian ‘state tradition’. At one level, the ‘Royal Wedding’ was
an expression of the Wittelsbachs’ power and influence within the Holy Roman
Empire, evidenced by a guest list headed by Kaiser Friedrich III. More importantly,
the re-enactment signalled the symbiotic relationship between monarchy and people,
exemplified by Ludwig’s generosity in paying for the local townsfolk to celebrate
the occasion.77 This symbolism was further reinforced by the fact that both the
Bavarian minister-president and the head of the House of Wittelsbach – Crown
Prince Rupprecht until his death in 1957, then Duke Albrecht – were the joint
patrons of the festival.78 Thus, despite Bavaria’s having had a republican form of
government since 1918, Rupprecht and Albrecht continued to assume the monarchy’s
role as the ‘dignified part’ of the constitution,79 which meant that they personified
the continuity of Bavarian statehood.
As the Landshut ‘Royal Wedding’ intimated, this state tradition did not exist
independently of Germany. Rather, as Seidel put it, there was an ‘age-old symbiosis
between Bavaria’s conception of the state (Staatsdenken) and the concept of the Reich
(Reichsdenken)’. This symbiosis was strengthened, he claimed, with the creation of
modern Bavaria, ‘for the Reich, which at the same time was Germany, was even more
at home in those Franconian and Swabian imperial (reichssta¨ndisch) territories than
in the Wittelsbach territorial state’.80 The ‘Reich consciousness’ of these territories
was exemplified most clearly by the former free imperial cities (Reichssta¨dte), such
as Nuremberg, Rothenburg and Dinkelsbu¨hl in Franconia, and Augsburg, Kempten
and Kaufbeuren in Swabia; they were ‘city-states’ that were subject to the direct
authority of the kaiser rather than a territorial prince. Of these, the most important
was Nuremberg. As Rudolf Schieffer has recently written, ‘Until 1806 Nuremberg
was not a site of Bavarian history, but rather of Reich history, of its kaisers and
kings’.81
But this history also belonged to Bavaria’s common heritage and was celebrated
as such. This was apparent during Nuremberg’s 900th anniversary celebrations in
77 Ibid., 10 June 1950, 6; 13 June 1953, 9; 7 July 1956, 3; 4 July 1959, 3; 23 June 1962, 8, 10. See also
Erich Stahleder and Stefan Ha¨rtl, Schlag nach: Die ‘Landshuter Hochzeit 1475’. Der Verein ‘Die Fo¨derer’
e.V., Daten+Fakten, Zugfolge, 4th edn (Landshut: Selbstverlag des Vereins ‘Die Fo¨derer’ e.V., 2005),
esp. 12–15.
78 Bayerische Staatszeitung, 14 July 1953, 7; Bayern-Kurier, 23 June 1962, 8.
79 Ju¨rgen Gebhardt, ‘Bayern, Deutschlands eigenwilliger Freistaat – Historisch-gesellschaftliche Aspekte
der politischen Kultur in Bayern’, in Roth, ed., Freistaat Bayern, 83–104, at 88.
80 Bayerische Verwaltungsbla¨tter, July 1958, 193, NL Seidel 14, ACSP.
81 Rudolf Schieffer, ‘Nu¨rnberg: Die Kaiserburg als Herrschaftszentrum der Salier und Staufer’, in Alois
Schmid and Katharina Weigand, eds., Schaupla¨tze der Geschichte in Bayern (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2003),
90–103, at 90.
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1950. Here the historical emphasis was very much on Nuremberg as a German city,82
with Ehard proclaiming that ‘900 years of Nuremberg means 900 years of German
history’.83 As Clemens Wachter has shown, one of the three principal focal points
of the celebrations was ‘Nuremberg and the medieval empire’, with the organisers
keen to stress the city’s loyalty to kaiser and empire.84 And this was a theme taken up
by the Bayern-Kurier. Despite Nuremberg’s prosperity in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, this was a city, the paper argued, that
did not forget its association with the kaiser and the empire. Karl IV’s Golden Bull of 1356
thus honoured Nuremberg by determining that each kaiser should hold his first imperial diet in
Nuremberg. Not many decades later, the imperial regalia, the most precious symbols of medieval
glory, came to Nuremberg. So Nuremberg became the secret capital of the medieval empire.85
This claim certainly pandered to local sensibilities, but it had greater political
resonance. In identifying Nuremberg as the ‘secret capital’ of the Holy Roman
Empire during the medieval period, the Bayern-Kurier was not only anchoring
Bavaria’s political heritage firmly within Germany, it was locating this heritage at
the heart of German affairs. Nuremberg’s loyalty to the empire in the past, therefore,
evoked modern Bavaria’s commitment to Germany in the present.
As with Bavarian statehood, historical re-enactment also played a role in continuing
to sustain the idea of Reich consciousness, most notably in Kaufbeuren’s ‘Ta¨nzelfest’,
reputedly the oldest children’s festival in Germany. The Ta¨nzelfest had its origins in
a visit to the city by Kaiser Maximilian I in 1497, and ‘his’ ceremonial entry into the
city played an important role in the festival. But its symbolic highpoint was the oath
of allegiance that the burghers swore to the Kaiser in front of the town hall, a clear
reminder that Kaufbeuren was once a city of the Reich.86 Taken together, the festival’s
various elements were, according to the Bayern-Kurier, ‘a piece of Kaufbeuren’s past, a
piece of Swabian, Bavarian and German history’,87 thus acknowledging the multiple
interlocking identities located within Bavaria’s common heritage.
It was Munich, though, that stood as the physical, urban embodiment of the
modern Bavarian state. Founded in 1158, Munich’s subsequent development as a
centre of political power was integrally linked to the Wittelsbach monarchy. And,
like the dynasty, Munich was ultimately constrained by Old Bavaria. As Seidel
told an audience during the city’s 800th anniversary celebrations in 1958, Munich’s
opportunities to shape political events during the medieval and early modern periods
were limited by the fact that it was the capital of a relatively small territorial state.
With the establishment of the modern Bavarian state, however, Munich’s political
importance was enhanced. But, for Seidel, the political Munich that now emerged
82 Clemens Wachter, Kultur in Nu¨rnberg 1945–1950: Kulturpolitik, kulturelles Leben und Bild der Stadt
zwischen dem Ende der NS-Diktatur und der Prosperita¨t der fu¨nfziger Jahre (Nuremberg: Stadtarchiv
Nu¨rnberg, 1999), 364.
83 Bayerische Staatszeitung, 15 July 1950, 1.
84 Wachter, Kultur in Nu¨rnberg, 363.
85 Bayern-Kurier, 15 July 1950, 6.
86 Ibid., 22 July 1961, 6; 14 July 1962, 6.
87 Ibid., 22 July 1961, 6.
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was no longer an Old Bavarian city as such: ‘The city became a true reflection of
Bavaria’s new population structure, it acted like a great melting pot, it supported the
growing together of the Bavarian population and so contributed fundamentally to
the creation of a new Bavarian state tradition, to the shaping of the Bavarian people
[Staatsvolk] and a state consciousness’.88
The CSU and Bavaria’s cultural heritage
The construction of the CSU’s integral Bavarian identity was not just a question of
‘political heritage’. Bavaria was understood to be a ‘cultural state’. Consequently,
Ehard emphasised an inclusive understanding of the region’s cultural heritage,
claiming that Bavaria had developed a ‘common culture’ and a ‘common cultural
consciousness’ during the course of the nineteenth century as a synthesis of the
region’s diverse cultural traditions.89 And Hanns Seidel made a similar point when
addressing the Junge Union – the youth wing of the CDU/CSU – in Straubing in
1958 when he noted that ‘[t]he particular cultural wealth of Bavaria is based on the
harmony of [the] three tribes’. ‘Here’, he went on to add, ‘the colourful splendour
of the Old Bavarian and Upper Swabian Baroque abbeys has as much place as the
Protestant burgher cultures of the former imperial cities of Franconia and Swabia.’90
Bavaria’s urban cultural heritage was located primarily, although by no means
exclusively, in the former imperial cities – that is, in the historic urban landscape,
epitomised by premodern, usually medieval, buildings: cathedrals, churches, patrician
houses, towers and walls. These were commodified townscapes, to be consumed
as a common Bavarian heritage, even after sometimes extensive wartime damage,
through various publications, such as the Bayern-Kurier, or experienced more directly
by readers either as delegates to CSU party gatherings or simply as tourists.91 The
emphasis on the premodern was by no means peculiar. The popularity of the Middle
Ages was a European phenomenon;92 and it is within this context that the ‘beautiful
old town’ became a symbol of German cultural identity in the nineteenth century.93
Here, within the built environment of cities such as Rothenburg, Augsburg and
Regensburg, Bavaria could boast of a rich architectural heritage, a heritage that placed
modern Bavaria at the heart of German and European cultural developments.94
Such historic urban landscapes were emblematic of the symbiotic relationship
between the regional and the national: tangible evidence that Bavaria’s past was
88 Seidel, ‘Die Haupt- und Residenzstadt Mu¨nchen’, 211–12.
89 Ehard, ‘Franken in Bayern’, 167.
90 ‘Freiheit, Heimat, Vaterland. Ansprache des Ministerpra¨sidenten Dr. H. Seidel auf der
Landesversammlung der Jungen Union in Straubing am 28.9.1958’ (MS), NL Seidel 15, ACSP.
91 On the consumption of the historic urban landscape see Rudy Koshar, ‘Altar, Stage and City:
Historic Preservation and Urban Meaning in Nazi Germany’, History and Memory, 3, 1 (1991), 30–59,
esp. 35–6, 47.
92 Keith D. Lilley, Urban Life in the Middle Ages 1000–1450 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 18.
93 Ju¨rgen Paul, cited in Joshua Hagen, ‘Rebuilding the Middle Ages after the Second World War: The
Cultural Politics of Reconstruction in Rothenburg ob der Tauber’, Journal of Historical Geography, 31,
1 (2005), 94–112, at 95.
94 Bayern-Kurier, 5 July 1952, 3; 13 June 1953, 3; 16 Jan. 1954, 3.
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inseparable from that of Germany. As the ‘ancestral’ capital of the Old Bavarians,
Regensburg was a case in point, with the Bayern-Kurier informing its readers that
‘for every visitor to Regensburg a stay inside its walls becomes a trip through the
centuries, through the history of Bavaria and Germany’.95 Some of these ‘medieval’
townscapes, such as Dinkelsbu¨hl’s, were even elevated to the status of national icon.96
But it was Munich, as the regional capital, that occupied a particularly important
place in this schema. Its nineteenth-century neoclassical transformation earned it the
epithet ‘Athens on the Isar’, a city, paraphrasing Ludwig I, ‘that had to be seen by
anyone who wanted to boast of having seen Germany’.97 As such, Munich’s urban
heritage spoke of Bavaria’s centrality to and cultural pre-eminence in the (West)
German state.
Bavaria’s cultural heritage was not just a matter of the historic built environment,
but also encompassed cultural figures – artists, sculptors, musicians, writers and the
like – and their works. Towns and cities were particularly eager to promote their
connections with cultural producers of regional and, above all, national standing –
usually as the place of birth and/or residence – in order to foster local pride and
identity. But in the pages of the Bayern-Kurier the local was constitutive of the
regional and, in turn, of the region’s contribution to the national. Once again,
however, Bavaria’s cultural heritage drew heavily on its former imperial cities, above
all Augsburg and Nuremberg. Pointing to painters such as Hans Holbein the Elder,
Hans Holbein the Younger and Hans Burgkmair, as well as the sculptor Gregor Erhart,
Augsburg claimed to be the crystallisation point of German art in the Middle Ages.98
Nuremberg not only rivalled, but in many respects surpassed, Augsburg as a cultural
centre in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. This was Nuremberg’s golden
age, a period in which the city embodied the ‘humanistic spirit’ in art and science,
epitomised by such nationally important figures as Willibald Pirkheimer (humanist),
Veit Stoss (sculptor), Adam Kraft (sculptor), Peter Vischer the Elder (brazier), Hans
Sachs (poet and cobbler), Peter Henlein (clockmaker) and, most famously of all,
Albrecht Du¨rer.99 These men and their works were therefore Bavarians’ common
heritage, tangible evidence not only of Bavaria’s cultural wealth, but of Bavaria’s
centrality to the culture of both Germany and Europe.
The CSU and Bavaria’s Christian identity
The CSU’s identification with Bavaria, then, was very much rooted in ‘political’
and ‘cultural’ conceptions of the state. But there was also a third dimension to
the party’s regional identity: it also attached a deeper ‘meaning’ to Bavaria as a
Christian state. In particular, it forged an identity around a regional ‘sense of mission’
95 Ibid., 5 July 1952, 3.
96 Ibid., 18 July 1959, 3.
97 Ibid., 14 June 1958, 3; Rudolf Walter Leonhardt, This Germany: The Story since the Third Reich
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), 255.
98 Bayern-Kurier, 24 June 1950, 8.
99 Ibid., 9 Oct. 1954, 3.
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(Sendungsbewußtsein), which Mintzel has conceptualised as the ‘Christian bulwark of
Bavaria’.100 This accorded the region-state a privileged position both as the impetus
for the Christian Occident’s (das christliche Abendland) spiritual renewal and as its
defender against godless communism.101 The ‘Christian Occident’ was a staple of
West German and Austrian Christian Democrats in this period. A somewhat diffuse
notion, its appeal lay in a vision of Europe rooted in medieval Christendom and
a concomitant rejection of materialism and secularism.102 Since it was primarily a
Catholic concept, the Church was at the forefront of organising commemorations
during the late 1940s and early 1950s to invest the ‘Occident’ with historical
legitimation.103 Yet the idea of the ‘Christian Occident’ also had its Protestant
adherents.104 Moreover, with the development of the Cold War, its practical political
expression rested on a virulent anti-communism, something which resonated with
most German Protestants, although some had doubts about Western integration and
remilitarisation.105 While it is certainly the case that in the early 1950s the CSU was
increasingly Catholic, much to the resentment, disillusionment and disgruntlement
of its Protestant members,106 there is nevertheless evidence to suggest that an attempt
was made to invest Bavaria’s ‘mission’ with interdenominational resonance.
For example, in 1952 the Catholic Bishopric of Wu¨rzburg celebrated the 1,200th
anniversary of the interment of the relics of St Kilian, the patron saint of both
the episcopate and the city. Born in Ireland in about 640, Kilian was martyred in
Wu¨rzburg, along with his two Irish companions, St Totnan and St Coloman, in 689.
Together, these three ‘missionaries’ were credited with Christianising Franconia, with
Kilian subsequently earning the epithet ‘Apostle of Franconia’.107 In his speech, Hans
Ehard drew on this Franconian Christian heritage as a source for Bavaria’s ‘sense
of mission’, identifying the ‘Franconian apostles’ with the creation of Christian
Europe and consequently the ‘Franconian-Bavarian Bishopric of Wu¨rzburg’ with
a ‘European ethos’.108 It was this Europe that was threatened by ‘the shadow of a
materialistic world’, an allusion to the forces of secularism, above all the communist
east. Repulsing this threat, he argued, was ‘only possible through a strengthening
100 Mintzel, Geschichte, 272ff.; also Kuntz, ‘Conservatives in Crisis’, 162–8.
101 See, e.g., Staatspolitische Umschau der ‘Bayerischen Einigung’ e.V., July–Aug. 1959, NL Besold 6, ACSP.
102 Axel Schildt, Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), esp. 21–38; Ronald J. Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad
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of faith’, inspiration for which was provided by the founders of the city and the
bishopric.109 Yet this speech cannot be understood simply in Catholic terms. For
although Ehard has been criticised for paying only lip service to Protestant concerns
within the CSU,110 he nevertheless had a denominationally inclusive understanding of
the Bavarian state. Hence earlier in his address Ehard pointed out that the ‘Franconian
Circle’ of the Holy Roman Empire had consisted of both Catholic and Protestant
territories: the bishoprics of Wu¨rzburg, Bamberg and Eichsta¨tt on the one hand and
the principalities of Ansbach and Bayreuth and the free imperial city of Nuremberg
on the other.111 Moreover, through a process of encounter, Franconia had developed
a religious consciousness that ‘tried more and more to work out what the Christian
faiths had in common’,112 a clear allusion to the city’s irenical tradition.113 It was
these traditions of coexistence, he argued, that were indispensable to Bavaria after
1815. Within this broader context, his invocation to a ‘strengthening of faith’ can be
understood as a Christian rather than a Catholic message.114
One Bavarian city, however, was synonymous with both the defence of the
Occident and denominational reconciliation: Augsburg. The former was symbolised
by St Ulrich and the battle of Lechfeld in 955, the latter by the Peace of Augsburg in
1555. In 955 the nomadic Magyars swept across Bavaria and Swabia, before eventually
laying siege to Augsburg. Here Bishop Ulrich led the defence of the city, allowing
time for King Otto I to muster his army and move south, where he engaged and
defeated the Magyars on the Lechfeld.115 Even before the millennium of the battle,
the Lechfeld had become a touchstone for the defence and victory of the Christian
Occident against the threat from the communist east.116 But as Matthias Pape has
recently shown, attempts to exploit the Lechfeld and St Ulrich reached their apogee
in 1955, in millennium celebrations choreographed by the conservative Catholic
Bishop of Augsburg, Joseph Freundorfer.117 Yet while the dominant tone of the
Lechfeld commemorations was Catholic, they were not exclusively so. After all,
60,000 Catholics and Protestants packed the city’s Rosenau stadium to hear speeches
by, among others, the new federal foreign minister, Heinrich von Brentano (CDU)
and the federal president, Theodor Heuss of the Free Democratic Party (FDP).118
Brentano used the occasion to engage in anti-communist rhetoric, emphasising the
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contemporary eastern threat to the Christian Occident, a line that was consistent
with that of the CSU.119 Heuss, on the other hand, used his speech to emphasise
another commemoration, that of the Peace of Augsburg.120 This too was consistent
with the CSU’s identity.
The symbolic importance of the Peace of Augsburg for an interdenominational
Christian party is unmistakeable, for it had recognised the parity of Lutheranism
with Catholicism in the Holy Roman Empire.121 Therefore, even before its
quatercentenary the Peace was being exploited for the CSU’s identity formation.
For example, in the week before Augsburg hosted the 1953 CSU party conference,
the Bayern-Kurier noted that the Peace ‘was of the greatest significance for peace and
toleration between the confessions’. The headline writer was even more explicit: ‘City
of the Religious Peace – City of the UNION’ the paper proclaimed, thus eliding a
celebratory reading of the historical event with the political identity of the party.122
When the Junge Union (JU) held its annual conference in Augsburg two years later,
Franz Sackmann, the regional chairman of the JU in Bavaria, and Hans Drachsler, the
chairman of the JU in Lower Bavaria and editor of the Bayern-Kurier, unashamedly
instrumentalised both the battle of Lechfeld and the Peace of Augsburg to further
the CSU’s virulent anti-communism and to invoke Bavaria’s Christian heritage in
shaping the direction of West German Christian Democracy. These two historical
events were, they claimed, ‘the correct guide for the future of the new generation
of Union politicians’. Yet the message was also unambiguously interdenominational.
Hence the Lechfeld was ‘the expression of the Christian-Occidental willingness to
repulse the danger of atheism and servitude that threatens from the east’, while the
Peace of Augsburg symbolised ‘for us the solemn duty to strengthen the defences
against the eastern threat with the sure weapon of the co-operation and unity of both
confessions’.123
Conclusion
The CSU’s hegemonic domination of Bavarian politics since the 1970s has led to the
elision of party and state: the CSU is the ‘official party’ of Bavarian state and society.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, by contrast, the ‘meaning’ of this identity was a
contested terrain within the CSU, so much so that a realignment of the party political
landscape on the centre right was by no means out of the question. As this article
has shown, even before the ‘turning point’ of the mid-1950s, the CSU was in the
process of constructing an integral Bavarian identity: articulating an inclusive vision
of the region-state by exploiting the past as a ‘political resource’, presenting modern
Bavaria’s diverse histories as a common heritage. This heritage was given tangible
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meaning through a local sense of place, fostering local pride, certainly, but more
importantly, configuring the uniqueness of the local as representative of the ‘tribal’,
the regional and, significantly, the national. As examples elsewhere demonstrate, the
instrumentalisation of the past is fundamental to the identity formation of ethno-
regionalist parties.124 But whereas ethno-regionalist parties typically use the past to
assert their distinctiveness from the national state in order to legitimise demands for
cultural protection, autonomy, federalisation or separation,125 the CSU asserted its
regionalism as constitutive of the nation. The CSU was thus able to accommodate
the ‘white–blue’ patriotism of Catholic Old Bavaria, while avoiding the particularist
excesses of the BVP, the BP and even its own clerical-conservative wing. At the
same time, by locating Bavaria’s ‘imagined past’ firmly within a German historical
context, the CSU committed Bavaria’s ‘imagined future’126 to the German nation
and the fledgling West German national state, something which spoke to liberal and
national-conservative opinion, above all in Protestant Franconia. The construction
of such an integral Bavarian identity, therefore, provided legitimation for the CSU’s
claim to be an interdenominational party that was able to represent both the regionalist
and national interest. The extent to which this identity came to have wider resonance
both within Bavaria and beyond is surely worthy of further investigation.
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